Transportation & Trade-Based Money Laundering Indicators

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Transportation and Trade-Based Money Laundering Mechanisms

Criminals often rely on trade-based mechanisms to transport and conceal illicit products with links to land conversion (e.g. illegally mined gold or illegally logged timber), as well as use trade-based money laundering to clean their criminal proceeds.

  • Co-mingling in supply chains: Criminals may look to “clean” illicitly sourced commodities or products by co-mingling or smuggling them with legally sourced commodities or products of the same type, thus making it harder to identify those that were illicitly sourced. Refineries, mills, factories, or other physical points in the supply chain where the source can be obscured. The co-mingling of illegally produced or stolen timber into legitimate sawmills is one of the most common ways for illicit timber to be moved, for example.
  • Ghost ships: Criminals may use so-called ghost ships or shadow fleets, which are vessels that disguise their movements to facilitate trade-based crimes, such as sanctions evasion, embargo circumvention, or money laundering. These ships turn off their automatic Identification systems (AIS) to conceal their locations and conduct illegal activities without detection. These create opaque parallel trade patterns that allow for illegal products of land conversion (like illicit timber and minerals) to be smuggled through the international shipping industry.
  • Phantom ships: Similar to ghost shipment fraud, criminals may falsify documentation to move funds in the guise of trade, without physically shipping any goods.
  • Trade diversion and transshipment: Criminals may look to re-route illicitly sourced commodities or restricted goods through intermediate countries to disguise their true origin or destination. This can help make illicit commodities appear legitimate or evade sanctions or trade restrictions. Timber, for example, may be illegally logged in a country with weak enforcement or forestry laws and then exported through an intermediary country to a final destination. This process often involves the altering of documentation to make it appear as though the timber originates in the intermediary country.
  • False invoicing and documentation: False invoicing involves either invoicing for a fake product, or over- or under-declaring the quantity or value of goods being shipped; this practice is used to move illicit commodities or proceeds across borders. False documentation could include forged letters of credit or customs and shipping documents. FIs should also be wary of relying on paper documentation, such as bills of lading: legal documents issued by carriers to shippers detailing the quantity, type, and destination of the goods in transit. These are sometimes hand-written and therefore susceptible to fraudulent alteration which may serve to obscure goods’ true provenance, thereby concealing illicit activity.
  • Bribery and corruption: Criminals may bribe customs officials to overlook discrepancies or false documentation to allow illicitly sourced or prohibited goods to pass through borders. Bribes may be paid through cash or transferred to bank accounts owned by a customs official, which are often disguised as legitimate transactions to avoid detection. Payment may also be paid in the form of luxury goods or other gifts such as travel or entertainment. There is also a risk of smaller, one-time bribes serving as a gateway to larger bribery and corruption schemes. Criminal groups engaging in wide-scale environmental crimes such as timber trafficking often have established networks and significant resources to bribe and corrupt officials at multiple levels - including offering a share of profits - or may turn to intimidation or coercion to force officials into compliance.
Transportation and Trade-Based Money Laundering Red Flags
  • Abnormal source or destination countries for a product that do not make economic sense (e.g. commodities that are not widely grown in or exported from a source country, imports to a destination country that is a large producer and exporter of that commodity).
  • Shipments or transactions where descriptions of ports are vague (e.g. 'Any safe world port').
  • Unusual changes of shipping routes (e.g. overly circuitous routes) or where a commodity is trans-shipped through one or more jurisdictions for no apparent economic or logistical reason.
  • Trade in products which are difficult to value.
  • Shipment in commodities which seem inconsistent with a client’s business profile.
  • Transactions where a shipper or a consignee insists on paying transportation costs in cash, or where these are paid by a third party (e.g. not a shipper or a receiver).
  • Change of the delivery address at any time after a commodity was shipped, as this could signal an intention to divert a shipment.
  • Discrepancies between the description or value of a commodity in shipping documents and invoices, relative to the actual goods shipped or actual value in payments made.
  • Questionable paperwork such as duplicate certificate numbers; missing permit details; potentially falsified signatures; anomalous, incomplete, or suspicious certificates of origin; dubious or vague descriptions of commodities on shipping documents and invoices and details such as the ship's name; IMO number, port of loading, and port of discharge missing or incomplete in the shipping documents.
  • Transactions which involve the use of repeatedly amended or frequently extended letters of credit without reasonable justification or for reasons like ‘changes of beneficiary or location of payment’.
  • Trade in noncertified timber (the two most widely used certification schemes are the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC)).
  • Trade in any timber species that appears on the CITES Appendix I or II.
  • Suppliers who aren’t transparent about the origins of any commodities or where the supply chain is overly long or complex (or where it involves companies with post office boxes rather than physical addresses): it is important to understand what a ‘normal’ supply chain looks like for any relevant commodities (e.g. paper tends to have shorter supply chains (e.g. forest, pulp mill and printer) than plywood, which goes through multiple brokers and supply tiers, and therefore warrants greater due diligence).
  • Significant differences between the wire transfers received and the noted freight on board value exported.
  • Consignments split or spread across multiple shipments.
  • The use of free trade zones and free ports.
  • Shipments that do not make economic sense (e.g. the use of a forty-foot container to transport a small amount of relatively low value merchandise).
  • The type of commodity being traded appears inconsistent with the exporter or importer’s usual business activities (e.g. a steel company that starts dealing in paper products, or an information technology company that suddenly starts dealing in bulk pharmaceuticals), or with the scale of the exporter or importer’s regular business activities.
  • Indications of carousel transactions (the repeated importation and exportation of the same high-value commodity).
  • Where certain documentation in a transaction is numbered sequentially/continuous numbers, which might indicate that either the documentation or the transaction itself is manufactured or false.
  • An entity that is registered in or has an office in a jurisdiction with weak AML and/or CFT compliance (e.g. on the FATF Black List or Grey List).
  • Are the owners or senior managers acting as nominee directors to conceal the true beneficial owners? Do the nominee directors appear to have the relevant experience to manage the company?

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